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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INFERENCE OF RETAINED LIFE IN-
TEREST UNDER SECTION 2036 (A) - In 1936 decedent established an irrev-
ocable trust naming herself and relatives as beneficiaries. The corporate 
trustees were directed to pay the trust income, in the exercise of their 
absolute discretion, either to the settlor or to the other beneficiaries. In 
filing her 1936 federal gift tax return settlor attempted unsuccessfully to 
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exclude the value of a life estate in the trust income, allegedly retained 
by her. At her death, the value of the trust corpus was not included in 
her estate tax return. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency1 contending 
that decedent-settlor had retained for her life the "possession or enjoyment" 
of, or the "right to income from" the trust corpus within the meaning of 
the forerunner of section 2036 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 
Plaintiff argued that since the trust was irrevocable and the trustees were 
vested with absolute discretion, settlor had retained nothing which could 
properly be included in her estate. In an action for refund of federal 
estate taxes, held, dismissed. Although a discretionary trust is ordinarily 
excluded from a decedent's gross estate, where the settlor had in fact re-
ceived all the income for her life and acted in the belief that she had a 
life interest in such income, an informal prearrangement to exercise dis-
cretion in favor of the settlor will be inferred. As such, the trust corpus 
must be included in the deceased settlor's estate. Estate of Skinner v. 
United States, 197 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1961), appeal taken by taxpayer 
to Third Circuit, CCH FED. EsT. & GIFr REP. 9007. 
The decision in the principal case is illustrative of the broad scope of 
section 2036 (a) , a provision requiring inclusion in one's estate of inter 
vivos transfers of property in which decedent had retained "the possession 
or enjoyment," or, in the alternative,3 "the right to income." Such transfers, 
although inter vivas, are considered, for tax purposes, as being essentially 
akin to testamentary dispositions. Although the provision is described as 
dealing with the retention of a "life interest," it has been construed to en-
compass more than the life estate known to property law.4 As such, the 
word "enjoyment," used in the setting of section 2036 (a), connotes "sub-
stantial present economic benefit,"5 rather than the technical vesting of 
title. However, since no more explicit definition of the language "posses-
sion or enjoyment" has been formulated, its use in the application of sec-
tion 2036 (a) has not yielded uniform results in connection with avoidance 
litigation. 
This problem is illustrated by the history of the section preceding the 
decision in the principal case. Generally it has been held that where one 
1 A credit was allowed for the amount paid as a gift tax in 1936. 
2 INT. REY. ConE OF 1954, § 2036 (a) (1) , successor of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 
§ 811 (c) (I) (B) (i) , under which the principal case was decided. 
s Estate of Uhl, 25 T.C. 22 (1955). See also 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL ESTATE AND 
GIFI' TAXATION § 24.08 (1959). 
4 E.g., Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958); Wells Fargo Bank&: Union 
Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1948); Estate of Holland v. Com-
missioner, 47 B.T .A. 807 (1942) • See generally LOWNDES &: KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND 
GIFI' TAXES, 130-73 (1st ed. 1956). See also Covey, Section 2036-The New Problem 
Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 121 (1960). 
5 Commissioner v. Holmes' Estate, 326 U.S. 480 (1946); Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 
F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958). 
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creates an irrevocable trust vesting in the trustee absolute discretion over 
corpus and income, such transfer is a completed gift inter vivas and is 
not includible in the decedent-settlor's gross estate, although he perhaps 
may have received incidental benefits after the transfer. 6 However, where 
by the terms of the trust the exercise of discretion in favor of the settlor 
is governed by some external standard which a court may apply in com-
pelling the exercise of that discretion, 7 or where the trust is created to 
discharge a legal obligation of support,8 or where it can be reached by 
creditors,9 it has been held that there is a retention of interest in the prop-
erty sufficient to satisfy the "enjoyment" requirement of section 2036 (a) .10 
In such circumstances it is obviously tempting for one to combine a trans-
fer such as an absolute discretionary trust, complete on its face, with an 
informal agreement allowing the retention of benefits by the settlor in an 
attempt to escape the estate tax on the property held in trust.11 In coping 
with this problem, courts have looked to the substance of such a transfer, 
its realities and not mere form, to determine its true character for tax 
purposes.12 Thus, in Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner13 it was held 
that a decedent who conveyed income-producing real estate with no reser-
vation of rents, and simultaneously entered into oral agreements with his 
children under which he received rents until his death, had in fact retained 
the "enjoyment" of the property, and therefore, it should be included 
in his gross estate. 
The holding in the principal case carries the proposition in McNichol 
one step further, by allowing the existence of such prearranged oral agree-
ment to be inferred from the receipt of income, rather than requiring it 
to be established by direct proof.14 From the standpoint of combatting 
6 See, e.g., In re Uhl's Estate, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v. Irving 
Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Commissioner v. Douglass' Estate, 143 F.2d 961 
(3d Cir. 1944). See also Comment, 38 N.C.L. REv. 638 (1960) . 
7 Estate of Boardman, 20 T.C. 871 (1953) . 
s Colonial-American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1957); 
Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 871 (1953); 
Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank 8e Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940); 
Estate of Lee, 33 T.C. 1064 (1960). 
9 Commissioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958). Cf. Estate of Uhl, 
25 T. C. 22 (1955), rev'd and remanded, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957) . 
10 For other illustrations of the indirect retention of income, see 3 MERTENS, supra 
note 3, at § 24.09. 
11 E.g., Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 3.'>6 U.S. 274 (1958); Greene v. 
United States, 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956); Estate of Bergan, l T.C. 543 (1943). See 
also 43 MINN. L. REv, 354 (1958) • 
12 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Commissioner v. Wilder's 
Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Wells Fargo Bank 8e Union Trust Co. v. United 
States, 80 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1948) ; Estate of Schwartz, 9 T.C. 229 (1947); Estate 
of Holland v. Commissioner, 47 B.T .A. 807 (1942) • 
13 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959) , 19 MD. L. REv. 348. See also Covey, supra note 4, at 126. 
14 But cf. Burrill v. Shaughnessy, 71 F. Supp. 99, 101 (N.DN.Y. 1947) "To draw the 
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avoidance of section 2036 (a) the court's attitude is justifiable. First, in 
requiring the inclusion of the trust corpus in decedent's estate, the fact 
that settlor thought she had a life interest in the income from the trust 
is certainly significant, as a factual matter, to the inference of a prearrange-
ment. Secondly, and more essential to the result, the court reasoned that 
since decedent-settlor had in fact received all income paid from the trust 
during her lifetime, she may properly be said to have retained the "enjoy-
ment" of the property. However, the legislative history behind section 
2036 (a) may subject this rationale to question; for it indicates that the 
language "possession or enjoyment" was intended to have reference only 
to a power over non-income-producing property,15 whereas in the instant 
case, income-producing assets comprised the trust corpus. Such being the 
intent of Congress,16 it would seem that the court should not have based 
taxability upon the retention of "possession or enjoyment" but rather upon 
the settlor's retention of the "right to income."17 This the court refused 
to do, saying that the presence of an absolute discretion in the trustees 
necessitated the conclusion that settlor had retained no legally enforceable 
right. But the regulations treat a right as having been retained "if at the 
time of the transfer there was an understanding, express or implied, that 
the interest or right would later be conferred."18 Moreover, the congres-
sional reports indicate that the words "right to" merely clarify the scope 
of section 2036 (a) 19 and do not require a legally enforceable right for tax-
ability.20 Thus, although the decision did not follow congressional intent 
by limiting the term "possession or enjoyment" to non-income-producing 
inference requested • • . is • • . to hold that the existence of a family relationship 
in itself is a handicap to one's right to contract or • • • express the virtue of unself-
ishness." See also McCullough v. Granger, 128 F. Supp. 6ll (W .D. Pa. 1955) • 
15 H.R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1949) . "The income interests de-
scribed in Section 2036 (a) ... include reserved rights to the income from transferred 
property and rights to possess or enjoy non-income producing property." See also 
LOWNDES 8e KRAMER, supra note 4, at 168, "Although Section 2036 (a) (2) includes the 
right to designate, not only income, but also the possession or enjoyment of the prop-
erty, the Regulations appear to restrict the right to 'possess or enjoy' the property to 
a power over non-income producing property." 
16 But see Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959) ; 
Struthers v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955). In these cases the application of 
"enjoyment" was not limited to non-income-producing property, though this point was 
not argued. 
17 See Harter v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1964 (N.D. Okla. 1954). 
18 Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1-a-ii (1958). 
10 The insertion of the words "right to" were intended to make it clear that the 
provision covered cases in which the decedent had the right to income but did not 
actually receive it. See S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 50 (1932). 
20 The following cases stand for the proposition that the "right to income" provision 
of § 2036 (a) imposes a factual and not a legal test of liability: Estate of Shearer, 17 T.C. 
304 (1951); Estate of Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947); Estate of Schwartz, 9 T.C. 229 (1947) . But 
cf. Estate of Trafton, 27 T.C. 610 (1956) • 
664 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
property, it could have done so and still required the inclusion of the 
corpus in the gross estate. 
Nevertheless, the principal case is significant in illustrating a rather 
unique application of section 2036 (a) , and in permitting the inference of 
an agreement which made the "retention" here a taxable one. Although 
the court failed to give effect to the congressionally-proposed dichotomy 
between income and non-income-producing property, such a distinction 
will probably never be determinative, as a practical matter, of the outcome 
of litigation. However, when viewed from the standpoint of the desira-
bility of maintaining the integrity of the death tax statute, the principal 
decision serves to check a possible means of avoidance under section 
2036 (a) , and, as such, seems justifiable. 
Donald E. Vacin 
